

The Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1987–2011

J. Graham Jones

The innovative (in a sense re-incarnated) Parliament for Wales Campaign, formed at the height of the Thatcher era in 1987 and soon attracting significant pockets of re-awakened support in at least some areas of Wales, was the ‘most significant coalition’ to campaign for Welsh devolution ever since its namesake predecessor body during the 1950s in Wales.

This essay seeks to track the origins, development, and activities of the PWC within the broader political developments and contests of the time. It aims to detail the organization’s leadership and most prominent individuals, the complex strands of its support, its strategy, finances, most significant publications, and relationship with other contemporary political campaigns and parties (most notably, of course, the Welsh Labour Party). It attempts to show how the PWC developed from an early voice demanding devolution for Wales to an advocate of greater legislative and financial powers in the debates surrounding the crucial second devolution referendum of September 1997, to its role as a ‘constructive but critical friend’ of the established Assembly from 1999 onwards. It also looks at its decisive contribution in the context of the framing and passage of the 2006 Government of Wales Act, the Richard Commission, and the legislative referendum of 2011 which greatly enhanced, and will continue to increase, the role, functions, and powers of the Welsh Assembly. The PWC made a highly significant contribution during the general election campaigns of 1992 and 1997 and played a major part during the preparations of the setting up and consolidation of the National Assembly in 1999 and its disparate functions.

The Parliament for Wales Campaign certainly played a key role in shaping popular opinion in Wales throughout the 1990s, creating a popular climate which was much more supportive of new and far more ambitious devolutionary initiatives. After the Assembly had come into existence in 1999, it is probably fair to say that the role of the PWC was at least somewhat reduced, but it continued to keep a watchful eye on developments in Cardiff Bay, exerting considerable pressure on certain carefully targeted individual politicians and campaigning consistently for expanded powers for the National Assembly, above all during the crucial months preceding the further referendum of 2011. Following the quite spectacular success in this vote, it was resolved to bring the campaign, gradually, to an end, and to present its considerable archive to the custody of the National Library of Wales. These fascinating records and campaign publications, together with the papers collected by several individuals, form the backbone of the research on which the present essay is based.

* * * * *

The Campaign for a Welsh Assembly, in a sense a re-birth of a similar body which had existed between 1950 and 1956 in Wales, was launched in 1987. It was

largely modelled on the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly which had been set up in 1980. Clearly the new body, cross-party and non-party in its essence, was the most significant coalition in the history of Wales to campaign for devolutionary initiatives, ‘the nearest Wales ever came to having a Constitutional Convention’.²⁰

Initially, the movement grew out of a campaign for a Welsh Senate set up at Cardiff in the wake of the May 1987 general election and securing support from activists in several different political parties.²¹ Wales had changed enormously from the nation which had so emphatically rejected devolution by 4 to 1 in the first referendum held on 1 March 1979 during the dying days of the beleaguered Labour administration led by James Callaghan. Both heavy industry and agriculture had continued to decline, while secondary manufacturing industries had increased in output, forging new economic relationships and novel patterns of Welsh employment – and indeed unemployment. Welsh society had been well nigh transformed by new patterns of immigration and emigration, changes in the Welsh media and education through the medium of the Welsh language, transport and communications, health, housing, crime patterns, welfare provision, and developments in local government and administration and indeed in the political climate of Britain as a whole following the election of a right-wing Conservative government in May 1979 which was then re-elected in June 1983.²² A new context had also been forged by a continued expansion in the size and range of responsibilities of the Welsh Office from the 1970s onwards, a trend which had certainly not been halted at all by the defeat of devolution in 1979.

Following the election of the third Thatcher administration in June 1987, Welsh devolutionists felt that the time was ripe to make a move. Welsh voting patterns contrasted starkly with those for the UK as a whole; the Labour Party now seemed more favourably disposed to consider devolutionary initiatives, while recent opinion polls had consistently shown majorities in favour of a Welsh assembly. It was estimated that some 60 per cent of the Welsh electorate was now favourably inclined towards some form of devolution, while 15 of the 24 Welsh Labour MPs were at least sympathetic to the cause. The recent re-structuring of Welsh government had also proved controversial and problematic, and there were now real hopes for a dynamic ‘all-party campaign’ which would lay the foundation ‘for the development of an anti-Tory electoral Front in the 1990s’.²³ Encouraging soundings had been taken at the previous Labour Party Conference in the autumn of 1986, and the Labour leader Neil Kinnock, the MP for Bedwellty, had ‘appeared to qualify his previous opposition to Welsh devolution’ in television interviews

- 20 Kevin Morgan and Geoff Mungham, *Redesigning Democracy: the Making of the Welsh Assembly* (Bridgend: Seren, 2000), p. 87. I am much indebted to Dr Huw Lewis, Institute of Welsh Politics, Department of International Politics, Aberystwyth University, for his valuable advice on printed sources on this topic.
- 21 Alan Jobbins, ‘Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1988–2011’, unpublished typescript, p. 1; Leighton Andrews, *Wales Says Yes: The Inside Story of the Yes for Wales Referendum Campaign* (Bridgend: Poetry Wales Press, 1999), p. 53.
- 22 See Rebecca Mair Jones, ‘From Referendum to Referendum: National Identity and Devolution in Wales, 1979–1997’ (unpublished PhD thesis, University of Wales, 2003), p. 86.
- 23 National Library of Wales (hereafter NLW), John Osmond Papers, file 1, John Osmond to Kim [Howells], 22 June 1986 [*recte* 1987].

during the recent general election campaign.²⁴

An All-Wales Working Party seeking to launch a Campaign for a Welsh Assembly was set up on 4 October 1987, and a meeting was convened at Aberdare in the heart of the old coalfield within a week. Problems were likely to emerge here, it was reported, ‘because of the sectarian spirit in which much of Cynon Valley politics are conducted’. But there was some optimism locally, ‘since the mood, attitudes and, often, people, had changed significantly since 1979’.²⁵ There was much greater enthusiasm, however, for the cause at Llanelli ‘where the Labour movement generally had long been in favour of an Assembly’ and the prospect of setting up ‘a thriving’ pro-devolution group in the town was certainly in prospect.²⁶ By the autumn of 1988, between twenty and twenty-five public meetings had been convened in different parts of Wales. The area where the CWA faced the greatest hostility was the Rhondda where the local Labour MP Allan Rogers warned the campaign to keep off his patch. (Ironically, the Rhondda was one of the divisions captured by Plaid Cymru in the first elections to the National Assembly in 1999.) In fairness to them, the early stalwarts of the CWA had chosen the term ‘assembly’ rather than ‘parliament’ in an attempt to retain the goodwill of the Welsh Labour Party executive, but this was largely in vain.

In the spring of 1988 the movement published the first in a series of ‘Strategy Papers’ which stated boldly, ‘Merely attacking the present regime at the Welsh Office and its policies of economic development, without an alternative vision of how the Welsh state bureaucratic structure can be organised and directed, is to ensure failure. Any alternative political programme must start from the reality of the Welsh bureaucratic state as it exists.’²⁷ The key point made here was that the Welsh Office had to be accountable to the National Assembly. Campaigners were encouraged by the spirited activities of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, now in its ninth year, which planned to set up a Constitutional Convention to draft an ambitious blueprint for a Scottish government and to press for a Scottish Assembly. Some Labour MPs in the north of England were calling for a Northern Regional Assembly too.²⁸

Devolution activists in Wales eagerly followed the inspiring course of events north of the border.²⁹ Organizers were heartened by Neil Kinnock’s recent apparent change of heart and by the consistent support now shown by Ron Davies, the Labour MP for Caerphilly, soon to be appointed the Shadow Secretary of State for Wales, and his front-bench team (although Davies had been active in the ‘No’ campaign back in the spring of 1979). Not all Welsh Labour MPs were, of course, enthusiastic. At its May annual conference the Welsh Labour Party set up a consultation exercise on a Welsh Assembly and local government reform in Wales,

24 Ibid.

25 Ibid., report on meeting at Aberdare, 11 October 1987.

26 Ibid., report on meeting at Llanelli, 13 March 1988.

27 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/1, Campaign for a Welsh Assembly Strategy Paper no. 1 (Spring 1988).

28 Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 54.

29 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/1, Campaign Notes, April 1988. There is also a copy in the NLW, Welsh Political Ephemera Collection, file C3/18.

while shortly afterwards, Geraint Howells, the ardently pro-devolution Liberal Democrat MP for Ceredigion and Pembroke North, moved a notably well-timed Early Day Motion in the House of Commons on the need for a Welsh Assembly or Parliament, ‘That this House urges the Government to bring forward proposals to devolve power to the people of Wales so that they will have their own parliament before the century is out.’ By the middle of July, thirteen Welsh Labour MPs had signed the motion, and it was well-known that a further four were fully committed to the cause.³⁰

The campaign received much backing from all the political parties active in Wales apart, predictably, from the Conservatives. By the autumn there were some eighteen active campaign branches: Cardiff, Newport, Ogwr, Merthyr Tydfil, Aberdare, Rhondda, Rhymney Valley, Swansea, Llanelli, Carmarthen, Narberth, Lampeter, Aberystwyth, Brecon, Llandrindod, Mold, Bangor, and Blaenau Ffestiniog. Five individuals had an especially high profile within the campaign and constituted its working party: Jon Owen Jones (the former Labour candidate for Cardiff Central), Siân Edwards (the former Plaid Cymru candidate for Cardiff South), Frank Leavers (the former SDP Welsh organizer, now a member of the Social and Liberal Democrats), Bert Pearce of the Welsh Communist Party, and John Osmond, a ‘non-political presence’ within the new campaign.³¹ Leavers underlined their goal: ‘The objective is to build a campaign from the bottom up rather than from the top down like last time.’³²

As pro-Assembly publicity escalated during the autumn of 1988, a Beaufort opinion poll for the BBC Wales programme ‘Public Account’ in November revealed that fully 48 per cent of those surveyed now supported an assembly for Wales (compared with 41 per cent at the time of the June 1987 general election), 22 per cent were undecided, only 10 per cent were against, while 20 per cent would not vote.³³ The campaign was then formally launched at its first national conference at Merthyr on 26 November 1988 when the speakers included two Labour MPs, Denzil Davies (Llanelli) and Ted Rowlands (Merthyr Tydfil), Geraint Howells, and Gwyn Alf Williams, the celebrated and prolific Welsh Marxist historian and a proud native of Dowlais, who enthralled his capacity audience of some 150 individuals by appealing for a Welsh Perestroika and describing recent events in the Soviet Union.

The cross-party and non-party character of the campaign was once more underlined and enhanced by the election of a representative campaign committee. The broader omens were indeed generally propitious: the ever expanding, and apparently unaccountable, Welsh bureaucracy comprising the Welsh Office and the notorious quangos was now spending in excess of £3.5 billion each year, there was a marked erosion in the powers of local government in Wales, there was a growing need for an enhanced Welsh representation in a rapidly integrating European Community, and an escalating demand for the decentralization of power

30 John Osmond, ‘An Assembly for Wales’, *Western Mail*, 18 July 1988.

31 Peter Underwood, ‘Will wagons roll on devolution?’, *South Wales Echo*, 2 August 1988.

32 Ibid.

33 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 9/1, unlabelled press cutting from the *Western Mail* headed, ‘Backing for Assembly’ [c. November 1988].

in Scotland (pointed up by the outcome of the recent Govan by-election) and in the north of England.³⁴ Developments in Scotland during 1987 and 1988 were especially influential in Wales.³⁵

At the first meeting of the campaign committee held at Rhayader, Jon Owen Jones was elected chairman, Geraint Howells and David Morris (the MEP for Mid and West Wales) became Vice-Chairmen, Maldwyn Pate of Cardiff took the office of secretary, and John Greateorex of Brecon was chosen treasurer.³⁶ Donations flowed in from supporters, but there was a setback in the summer when the National Eisteddfod court repeatedly refused a request from the campaign to rent a booth on the eisteddfod *maes* at Dyffryn Conwy and to convene a public meeting in Pabell y Cymdeithasau (the Societies Tent).³⁷ But enthusiasm for constitutional reform was certainly still in the air during 1990. Early in the year, Labour Party leader Neil Kinnock confirmed his conversion to the cause when he said, 'In the decade ahead we are going to see the national boundaries of Europe diminish in importance, while regional and local identities grow in significance.'³⁸ In September, the annual conference of the Liberal Democrats supported far-reaching constitutional reforms including 'home rule' for Wales and Scotland, elected regional assemblies for England, and the replacement of the House of Lords by a mainly elected Senate. Support also came from Charter '88, a cross-party constitutional reform pressure group which now came out firmly in support of an elected Assembly for Wales, and there were encouraging indices of a marked change of heart on the part of many within the Labour Party.³⁹

On 30 November 1990, the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly published its detailed plans for a fully-fledged Scottish Parliament, and within days the Campaign for a Welsh Assembly, spurred into renewed action, announced that a revised 'draft document for the future of Wales' would be published early in the new year.⁴⁰ It was also resolved to open a new national office as a power base at Cardiff from 1 December (a move made possible by the ready support of the National Union of Civil and Public Servants who gave considerable financial support), Rhobart Bryn Jones, the campaign secretary, heralding the move as 'a vital step forward in our programme since it will enable us to acquire the resources needed for an efficient organization to function effectively'.⁴¹ The following March Isobel Lindsay, convenor of the Campaign for a Scottish Assembly, was the guest speaker at the AGM of the Campaign for a Welsh Assembly at Merthyr. The subsequent discussion focussed on the kind of assembly needed in Wales.⁴²

34 Ibid. file 1/1, Strategy Paper no. 2 (autumn 1988).

35 See *The Scotsman*, 28 November 1988, 'Telling evidence' (editorial column).

36 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/1, circular letter from Maldwyn Pate, campaign secretary, January 1989.

37 Ibid., minutes of an interim council meeting at Aberystwyth, 3 June 1989.

38 Neil Kinnock, speech to the Regional Government Conference at Newcastle, 1990, cited in Morgan and Mungham, *Redesigning Democracy*, p. 87.

39 See John Osmond, 'Parliament far from the people', *Western Mail*, 19 September 1990.

40 James Cusick, 'Scots Convention finalises plan for devolved rule', *The Independent*, 28 September 1990; *Western Mail*, 4 October 1990.

41 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/1, press release, 30 September 1990.

42 Ibid., file 1/2, press release 'Wales to follow Scottish example?', 7 March 1991.

In August 1991, Plaid Cymru president Dafydd Wigley readily agreed to become one of the movement's vice-presidents.⁴³ That summer, too, the National Eisteddfod authorities relented and allowed the campaign to convene a highly successful meeting on the eisteddfod *maes* where no fewer than 350 people turned up – by far the largest attendance at any public meeting throughout that week – and the occasion was widely reported in the Welsh press and on television.⁴⁴ Although enormous strides had been made, and it was clear that fully 70 per cent of the Welsh electorate now supported a national assembly, the campaign still had some doubts – ‘Our problem at the moment is that we lack momentum and because of this we lack sufficient credibility to command a high public profile.’ There were plans to publish a discussion document entitled ‘The Government of Wales’ during 1992, but there was much pressure on the campaign to offer more specific details of its plans and objectives.⁴⁵

By the spring of 1992, the campaign had an individual membership of 674.⁴⁶ It received a major fillip on 2 April, just one week before the general election, when more than 900 people – many prominent politicians, churchmen, and writers among them – put their names to a two-page advertisement in the *Western Mail* which called for a constitutional conference to be held after the general election, probably early in 1993, to thrash out the details for a draft parliamentary bill for an elected Assembly which would have ‘effective decision-making powers over the whole range of Welsh policy under the control of the Welsh Office’. The proposed Assembly was also to be ‘financially responsible’, denoting that it would not be allowed to spend money without having the power to raise it.⁴⁷ Similar small advertisements were placed in the *Daily Post* and *Y Cymro*. In its 1992 general election manifesto, the Labour Party expressed its commitment to a directly-elected, Wales-wide body, while the extreme centralizing of power by successive Thatcher governments had caused several former opponents of devolution to reverse their positions.⁴⁸

The press advertisements at the beginning of the month led to a dramatic surge in membership to more than 1000 individuals. Finance, however, remained a perpetual bogey, and John Osmond urged the membership to set up monthly standing orders of at least £5 to ensure the future financial vitality of the movement at a crucial time.⁴⁹ Other bodies declared their support for the campaign's objectives, among them the Wales TUC, CYTUN, and Churches Working Together, while in June Plaid Cymru held its own national rally at Aberystwyth to launch its own campaign ‘for an elected parliament with a voice for Wales in Europe’. Its general secretary Dafydd Williams said:

43 Ibid. file 7/1, Dafydd Wigley to R. B. Jones, 6 August 1991.

44 Ibid. file 1/2, NEC minutes, 5 October 1991.

45 Ibid., memorandum entitled ‘Public relations – 1991’, [late 1991].

46 Ibid., NEC minutes, 26 April 1992.

47 *Western Mail*, 2 April 1992; Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 57.

48 See, e.g., ‘Why I changed my mind on Devolution’, *Western Mail*, 27 January 1992.

49 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/2, circular letter from John Osmond, June 1992.

This weekend's rally will mark the beginning of the most decisive campaign ever waged by Plaid Cymru. We will be spelling out a practical alternative to the absurd situation in which Wales is governed from London by a government rejected at the polls by our people. Plaid Cymru believe that there is now unprecedented support in Wales for self-government. [...] We reject the right of a Tory government to foist on us a colonial-style Governor-General who does not even represent a Welsh constituency.⁵⁰

Plaid Cymru's standing had been much enhanced by its recent capture of the Ceredigion and Pembroke North division by Cynog Dafis who had stood on a novel joint platform with the Green Party. October saw the setting up of the Steering Committee on the Constitution, composed initially of the Campaign for a Welsh Assembly, the Welsh TUC, and CYTUN. The CWA representatives were Jon Owen Jones, the Labour MP for Cardiff Central, and Ioan Bowen Rees, formerly the Chief Executive of Gwynedd County Council.⁵¹ Ron Davies, the new Shadow Secretary of State for Wales, came out powerfully in support of a Welsh assembly, but asserted his belief that the Welsh Labour Party, with 27 MPs in Wales and fully 49.5 per cent of the popular vote, should really be prepared to go it alone without needing to join forces with other political parties.⁵²

Early in 1993, it was agreed that the name of the movement should formally be changed to Parliament for Wales Campaign (the PWC) – a warmly endorsed initiative, soon to be confirmed at the campaign's AGM on 6 June.⁵³ There was also renewed talk of arranging for a national petition. As a result of insistent appeals, the financial situation had improved. The number of standing orders had increased to about 100 which brought in some £500 or £600 each month. It thus proved possible to pay a grant of £100 each from central funds to individual county branches, to purchase essential computer equipment, and set up additional campaign groups in various parts of Wales. Promotional badges, T-shirts, and car stickers were made available.⁵⁴

Optimism surged and commitment intensified as ambitious plans were laid for a four-year programme extending to the next general election and embracing the publication of a substantial number of pamphlets, leaflets, and posters, the holding of an array of public meetings throughout the principality, and a series of joint meetings with Scottish devolutionists, these receiving full coverage and publicity in the media, and, eventually, the collection of signatures on a national petition in 1995–96 to be presented to parliament – potently reminiscent of a similar national

50 NLW, Plaid Cymru Archives, file M828, press release, June 1992, 'Plaid Cymru to kick off Parliament Campaign'.

51 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/2, minutes of a meeting of the National Council at Llanidloes, 13 September 1992 and 15 November 1992.

52 *Western Mail*, 9 November 1992.

53 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/3, minutes of AGM and annual conference, 6 June 1993.

54 *Ibid.* report by John Osmond, 28 January 1993; National Council minutes, 28 March 1993.

petition presented back in 1956.⁵⁵ At the PWC executive committee meeting in June, the following wording was agreed for the petition forms: ‘We the undersigned demand an elected Parliament for Wales. We petition the government to introduce legislation to establish a Parliament now.’ A target of one million signatures was set as attainable.⁵⁶ It was also agreed that pressure should be placed on the Labour Party Wales and TUC Wales who would be formulating and finalizing their devolution policies by the spring of 1995.

The National Petition was launched on the National Eisteddfod field at Builth Wells on the morning of Monday, 2 August, when representatives of all the major political parties in Wales (except the Conservatives), led by Ron Davies, participated in a symbolic ceremonial signing ceremony. The campaign’s stand on the field was staffed by volunteers throughout the week who avidly encouraged visitors to sign the carefully worded petition. Each day members donning the masks of well-known personalities – John Major, the Prime Minister, the Prince of Wales, and Mr Spock (from the popular television show, *Star Trek*) – carried large, colourful sandwich boards, like Pied Pipers urging people, ‘Follow me to the great sign-in.’⁵⁷ Fears were expressed that the petition might not be organized effectively at local level, and the hope was expressed that Petition Liaison Officers would be appointed to co-ordinate the work in the various localities. During the National Eisteddfod week, Hywel Ceri Jones, acting Director-General of the European Commission, came out strongly in support of the setting up of a Parliament for Wales and equal status for the Welsh language, a line of argument strongly supported by the recently retired judge His Honour Dewi Watkin Powell.⁵⁸

There is some evidence of internal disagreements. The campaign’s secretary, John Humphreys, ‘still felt strongly that the Campaign must become more confrontational rather than give the impression that it is playing with politics’. John Osmond agreed ‘that he wanted to be more confrontational on the issues and not with regard to individual Quangos. He consider[ed] that the Campaign [was] in the business of creating a consensus within Wales – he want[ed] to attract as many “parties” as possible to support the Campaign. He also warned that the Campaign must be very wary of having internal confrontations’.⁵⁹ By this time, the campaign had a personal membership of 935 individuals, a total which had exceeded 1000 by the end of the year. In addition, there were some 20 county and district councils, and a large number of community and town councils and trades union branches which had joined as corporate members.⁶⁰ At this very time feelings were running high as the Public Accounts Committee was fully exposing the deep-rooted scandal

55 NLW, John Osmond Papers, file 3, Gwilym Prys-Davies to John Osmond, 2 April 1993. See also *ibid.*, Lord Hooson to John Osmond, 25 May 1993.

56 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4b, executive committee minutes, 16 June 1993.

57 *Ibid.*, file 1/3, circular letter from John Humphreys, 13 July 1993; ‘Osmond on Monday’, *Western Mail*, 2 August 1993.

58 *Ibid.*, file 9/1, press cutting from the *Western Mail*, August 1993.

59 *Ibid.*, executive committee extraordinary meeting minutes, 15 July 1993.

60 Material in the NLW, Bert Pearce Papers (the Welsh Communist Party Archive), file WN6/1; NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4a, circular report by John Osmond, December 1993.

surrounding the affairs of the Welsh Development Agency, and it was feared that many other quangos were also totally ‘out of control’ as well.⁶¹

The pace of the campaign now moved up a gear as plans were formalized and developed for an ambitious Democracy Conference to be held at Llandrindod Wells during the first weekend of March 1994, its convention facilitated by a grant of £2,500 from the Rowntree Trust.⁶² A meeting was arranged with the officials of Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (Welsh Language Society) to discuss common aims, and in January 1994 John Osmond was invited to speak at a rally at Swansea to press for a stronger Welsh language act than the one which was currently under consideration.⁶³ It was also hoped to arrange a campaign march from Blackwood to Newport to collect signatures for the petition, recalling the Chartist uprising at the Westgate Hotel, Newport in November 1839. This march, it would seem, never came to fruition. But generally the campaign progressed well. During the first two months of 1994 there were 82 new registered members – 36 individuals, 43 local councils (most of these community and town councils), and three trades union branches.⁶⁴

The Llandrindod Conference of 5 and 6 March 1994, potently reminiscent of similar campaign launch events at the very same venue in 1950 and 1978, proved a major success, attended by more than 250 people (twice the anticipated number) from all parts of Wales and representing various political affiliations; two additional hotels had to be booked to accommodate them. They included representatives of churches, trades unions, university students, local councils, women’s groups, green organizations, and various cultural organizations. The executive of the Labour Party Wales, viewing the campaign as far too closely allied to the Plaid Cymru position on devolution, put considerable pressure on Labour MPs and members to boycott the conference and indeed organized a rival conference at Newport on the same weekend which became a damp squib. People like Rhodri Morgan and Wayne David were pressurized into withdrawing from the Llandrindod Conference, but three Labour MPs from south Wales – Paul Flynn, Jon Owen Jones, and Peter Hain – bravely defied the party ban and attended. They were all duly summoned before the WLP executive and severely reprimanded ‘for liaising with outside bodies and for defying the injunction to keep the devolution debate inside the party’.⁶⁵

The argument of the executive was that no attempt should be made to emulate the course of events in Scotland as the nationalist cause was much stronger in Scotland than in Wales, a mantra which, it was claimed, justified their ‘go-it-alone strategy’.⁶⁶ But Hain spoke out at the conference, as, too, did Alex Carlile and Cynog Dafis. For the Conservatives, Jonathan Evans spoke against devolutionary initiatives. Peter

61 *Western Mail*, 9 July 1993.

62 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4a, letters from Lois Jefferson, Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust Ltd., York, to John Osmond, 7 and 22 September 1993.

63 NLW, Bert Pearce Papers, file WN6/2ii, minutes of PWC council meeting at Rhaeadr, 20 February 1994.

64 *Ibid.*

65 Morgan and Mungham, *Redesigning Democracy*, p. 88.

66 See Richard Wyn Jones and Bethan Lewis, ‘The Welsh Labour Party and Welsh Civil Service: Aspects of the Constitutional Debate in Wales’, Department of International Politics, University of Wales, Aberystwyth (undated).

Hain attributed the recent sea-change in attitudes towards devolution which he had witnessed in his Neath constituency to three main factors: the Conservative attacks on democracy in Wales since 1979, the growing importance of Europe, and his conviction that, economically, it made sense to embrace devolution. He announced that Ron Davies had given a pledge that an incoming Labour government would legislate for a Welsh assembly within a year of assuming office – a major breakthrough. He argued, too, that the holding of a national referendum might well impede progress – ‘I’m not really interested in a referendum, but I’m not afraid of one either.’⁶⁷

At Llandrindod, a ‘Democracy Declaration’ was debated and then duly adopted at the campaign’s AGM at Aberystwyth. Large advertisements were then published in the *Western Mail* and *Daily Post* on 2 June. The debate on Welsh devolution was clearly progressing considerably.⁶⁸ As a follow-up to the Llandrindod Conference, campaign officials addressed a fringe meeting at the Welsh Liberal Democrats national conference at Cardiff the following weekend when Alex Carlile came out strongly in support of the aims of the campaign. Some concern was, however, expressed at the slow rate at which petition signatures were being collected, although the reception was generally encouraging in those areas which had been canvassed. The aim now was to present a mass petition bearing at least 250,000 signatures to parliament at some point during 1996.⁶⁹

The campaign sought to clarify its relationship with the political parties in Wales:

There are a number of misconceptions amongst some sections of the Labour and trade union movement about the Campaign which we would like to address. It must be stressed that the Campaign is a genuine cross-party movement in which Labour Party members and trade unionists are playing a major role. [...] As Labour supporting trade unionists we believe that the Labour Party should be steering the Campaign as opposed to being a back-seat driver. If the Campaign was dominated by Plaid Cymru/Nationalist personnel and thinking, as has been suggested, then frankly we would not be interested in promoting the Campaign.⁷⁰

To some extent, the momentum being gained was undermined by the sudden death in May 1994, at a relatively early age, of the Labour Party leader John Smith, a committed and eminently humane devolutionist sympathizer throughout his

67 Cited in Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 58.

68 See Kevin Morgan and Geoff Mungham, ‘Unfinished Business: Labour’s Devolution Policy’, in J. Barry Jones and Denis Balsom (eds), *The Road to the National Assembly for Wales* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 2000), p. 36.

69 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4a, executive committee meeting minutes, 11 April 1994; *ibid.*, file 6/3, campaign press releases for details of petition activities; *Evening Post*, 25 May 1994, for the response at Swansea.

70 NLW, John Osmond Papers, file 4, PWC circular, 21 April 1994.

political career, certain to introduce legislation on gaining office.⁷¹ In June, at the height of the European elections campaign, a highly successful Democracy Day was held in association with the Charter '88 Wales movement, when a number of notably well-attended public meetings were held, and some 900 individuals publicly declared their support for a Welsh parliament.⁷² Plans were made to publish by the autumn as a volume the proceedings, edited by John Osmond, of the Llandrindod Conference, a series of seminars was arranged with church and trades union groups as well as a joint conference with Scottish campaigners, and there were aspirations for 'a strong presence' at the 1995 political party conferences.

To achieve such aspirations, a firmer financial base was required. By June 1994, the campaign had a regular income of about £600 a month from standing orders set up by some 130 committed individuals, but, given the real need for a full-time, salaried organizer, this needed to be increased substantially.⁷³ On 18 June, Owen Dudley Edwards presented a message of support on behalf of the campaign to the major Coalition for Scottish Democracy Conference on a Scottish Senate convened at Edinburgh.⁷⁴ In July, plans were finalized to publish the proceedings of the Llandrindod Conference by Gwasg Gomer, Llandysul, in a paperback edition, with an initial print-run of 1000 copies. During the same month a tent was hired to publicize the campaign on the Royal Welsh Show field when some 2800 signatures were added to the national petition and substantial canvassing was undertaken to promote the cause.⁷⁵

Some time later, the Welsh Labour Party published a discussion document, *Shaping the Future: a Consultation Paper on the Powers and Structure of the Welsh Assembly*. This substantial document gave full consideration to various means of financing the proposed Welsh assembly, the prospects of endowing it with some form of legal authority, different possible ways of electing assembly members, and its likely method of operation. The Parliament for Wales Campaign, on reflection, gave it a cautious welcome, stressing yet again, 'The Welsh system of bureaucratic government that exists lacks democratic legitimacy. It will continue to do so until it is made responsible to a directly elected Parliament and the people of Wales are placed at the centre of the system, and not on its periphery.'⁷⁶ In August 1994, Peter Hain made use of his first appearance on the stage of the National Eisteddfod held in his Neath constituency to issue a highly emotive 'battle-cry for action against the rise of Neo-Nazism and racism throughout Europe'. He appealed for a 'democratically-elected Parliament for Wales. [...] We desperately need

71 See the poignant reflections in Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 59.

72 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 10/2, *Parliament for Wales Campaign Bulletin*, June 1994. See also the editorial 'Beyond words' in the *South Wales Echo*, 3 June 1994.

73 NLW, John Osmond Papers, file 4, PWC circular, June 1994.

74 Material in the NLW, Bert Pearce Papers, file WN6/1.

75 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4b, executive committee meeting minutes, 4 and 25 July 1994.

76 *Ibid.*, file 5/7a, 'Empowering the Future: Response to the Welsh Labour Party's Consultation Paper *Shaping the Future: a Consultation Paper on the Powers and Structure of the Welsh Assembly*, agreed by the National Council of the Parliament for Wales Campaign, Rhayader, 1 October 1994'.

economic investment to attract industry and to create jobs in the valleys so that our communities can go from strength to strength.⁷⁷ During the course of the week, some £600 had been raised by the PWC from the sale of merchandise, membership fees and donations, while 3,500 signatures had been added to the national petition. An encouraging public meeting had also been held in Pabell y Cymdeithasau.⁷⁸

A little later, firm plans were made to increase the collection of signatures on the petition. Everyone associated with the campaign agreed that the run-up to the next general election, widely anticipated to be held in the autumn of 1996 or the spring of 1997, was crucial to its success. In October the attractive volume *A Parliament for Wales*, the edited proceedings of the Llandrindod Conference, was launched successfully, although its publication proved something of a financial millstone for the campaign's rather over-stretched resources. Although Gwasg Gomer generously donated the sum of £500 towards the costs of publication and hosting the launch meeting, the campaign still had to find some £750 out of its own pocket, and the campaign's treasurer felt distinctly unhappy at the course of events.⁷⁹ But the considerable publicity engendered by the volume's publication was undoubtedly beneficial to the campaign's standing and progress, while seventy press releases were sent out to local newspapers and *papurau bro* throughout Wales.

That autumn, too, at the Labour Party Annual Conference, Ron Davies, speaking with all the authority of the Shadow Secretary of State for Wales, delivered a powerful, supportive peroration which pointed up the close inter-relationship between Welsh national identity and Welsh national economic, political, and social institutions: 'Like the Scots we are a nation. We have our own country. We have our own language, our own history, traditions, ethics, values and pride. We now in Wales demand the right to decide through our own democratic institutions the procedures and the structures and the priorities of our own civil life.'⁸⁰ Davies's commitment to the cause was impressive, but his impassioned views were certainly not shared by everyone within the Welsh Labour Party. (The following spring, a *Western Mail* editorial described him with some sarcasm as having 'gone native'.⁸¹)

Throughout the autumn and early winter of 1994, the Policy Committee of the Welsh Labour Party held a series of public consultations on Welsh devolution. The committee was chaired by Ken Hopkins, the secretary of the Rhondda Labour Party and a respected local headteacher, its secretary was Anita Gale, and its membership included Ron Davies and Lord Cledwyn of Penrhos, the Secretary of State for Wales from 1966 until 1968 and a committed devolutionist himself.⁸² A campaign review at the end of the year revealed that, of those approached, some 73 per cent

77 *Western Mail*, 1 August 1994.

78 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4a, executive committee meeting minutes, 5 September 1994.

79 *Ibid.*, file 1/4b, National Council meeting minutes, Rhayader, 1 October 1994, and executive committee meeting minutes, 5 December 1994.

80 Cited in John Osmond, *Welsh Europeans* (Bridgend: Seren, 1995), p. 79.

81 Cited in Jones, 'From Referendum to Referendum', p. 110.

82 On Ken Hopkins, see 'Labour mourns South Wales Valleys stalwart Ken Hopkins', BBC News website, 29 July 2011 (accessed 14 July 2014).

had agreed to sign the national petition, but it was agreed that much hard work lay ahead.

By this stage the debate focused primarily on what kind of assembly or parliament would be most beneficial for Wales. Opponents, of which plenty existed, vocally underlined the alleged excessive costs of such an institution, the gaping north-south divide within Wales, and the fear that Welsh speakers alone would be given the plum posts in any assembly – red herrings inherited from 1979 and earlier still. The Parliament for Wales Campaign insisted, ‘Our campaign is not the only organisation in favour of a Welsh Parliament, but it is the only general umbrella group that can bring together all interests supporting Welsh democracy and can therefore foster the necessary debate on the best form of democratic government for the good of *all* people and not just some of the vested interests.’⁸³ Political passions evidently ran high. Walter Sweeney, the Conservative MP for the Vale of Glamorgan, although holding his seat with the smallest parliamentary majority in the whole of the UK, adamantly refused to jump on the devolution bandwagon, virulently scorning the popular call for a national assembly: ‘It’s a ludicrous idea, a waste of money and likely to lead to extra taxes for living in Wales. The people of Wales have voted against devolution before. If the facts were fairly laid before them, they would do the same again. If you were to ask the people if they want an extra tier of government which is going to cost them even more money, they would say no to it’.⁸⁴

Sweeney’s blunt view was counterbalanced by that of Rhodri Morgan, the Labour MP for Cardiff West, himself a former Welsh Office civil servant. ‘There is such a high level of dissatisfaction and such a high level of desire to replace to replace the current system with something better that I cannot see the people *not* supporting an assembly.’⁸⁵ A telephone hotline set up by the *Wales on Sunday* newspaper saw 1985 people contacting them, 92 per cent of these voicing firm support for devolutionary concessions, even Welsh political independence in many cases. Plaid Cymru president Dafydd Wigley expressed his ‘delight’ at the revelation, ‘After fifteen years of Conservative government people can see the need for Wales to have a proper say in how the country is run.’ Secretary of State for Wales John Redwood expressed his ‘surprise’ at the outcome.⁸⁶

There was indeed much public dissatisfaction at the nature of Welsh government, particularly at the role of the ever increasing number of quangos, possibly 350 in total by the beginning of 1995.⁸⁷ The spiralling Welsh Office employed no fewer than 2,400 civil servants (compared with just 225 at the time it was set up in 1964), and controlled a budget approaching £7 billion a year (over 70 per cent of public expenditure in Wales), £2.5 billion of this supporting the quangos. The Welsh Secretary of State and other ministers were responsible for 1,400 appointments to

83 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/4b, *Parliament for Wales Campaign Bulletin*, December 1994.

84 *Wales on Sunday*, 11 December 1994.

85 *Ibid.*

86 *Ibid.*, 18 December 1994.

87 Council of Welsh Districts, ‘Quangos in Wales – A Discussion Document’, January 1995.

the Welsh quangos.⁸⁸ The role and nature of the quangos, which were certainly not democratically accountable, were indeed a particular bone of contention throughout Wales. In 1996, Kevin Morgan coined the term ‘Quangoland’ as a description of Wales. A survey of appointments to the quangos undertaken by David Hanson, the Labour MP for Delyn, at the end of 1993 led him to conclude that the Welsh quangos were ‘overstuffed with white, male businessmen, lawyers and accountants, with a sprinkling of establishment figures for good measure. The pattern of appointments represents the face of the Conservative Party and their sympathizers, not the people of Wales.’⁸⁹

Difficulties were intensified by the well-publicized problems of the Welsh Development Agency during those years which focused public attention on the issue of accountability. The costs involved in the running of the WDA and other quangos were enormous – far in excess of the costs of local government councillors.⁹⁰ There was deep concern, too, at the impending reorganization of Welsh local government in April 1996, when twenty-two new unitary authorities would come into being, and the number of elected councillors in Wales was expected to fall from 1,974 to 1,273. The Conservative Party held only six Welsh constituencies at Westminster and controlled not a single Welsh county.⁹¹ Passions were further inflamed by John Redwood’s demands for substantial cuts in the education budgets by the Welsh counties, and by real fears that the escalating costs of implementing the provisions of the Welsh Language Act could prove detrimental to public services.⁹²

Although the Conservative Party had secured the votes of only a small proportion of Welsh voters, it had ruled Wales continuously from 1979 until 1997. A succession of English-born, English-speaking Secretaries of State had run the Welsh Office even though, with the exception of Nicholas Edwards, they represented constituencies in England. Hostility grew apace, to such an extent that they began to be viewed as alien governor-generals or viceroys.⁹³ This entrenched perception of democratic deficit increased as support for the Conservatives declined in polls both for the Westminster Parliament and at local government level. As Ron Davies put it, ‘I vividly recall the anguish expressed by an eloquent graffiti artist who painted on a prominent bridge in my constituency overnight after the 1987 defeat the slogan “We voted Labour, we got Thatcher!” I felt the future was bleak. Despite commanding just 29 per cent of the Welsh popular vote [...] the Conservatives had won a third general election. For me, this represented a crisis of representation.

88 See Kevin Morgan and John Osmond, ‘The Welsh Quango State’, [?1995]; John Osmond, ‘The Contradictions of Welsh Politics’, *Scottish Affairs*, no. 11 (1995), 47.

89 David Hanson MP, ‘Unelected, Unaccountable and Untenable: a Survey of Appointments to Public Bodies in Wales’, December 1993.

90 See Ron Davies MP, ‘The Cost of Accountability: a Survey of the Administrative Costs of Welsh Quangos’, September 1994. According to Davies, the average allowance for a backbench councillor in Wales was about £2,000 per annum, while the equivalent for a Welsh quango board member was £8,339.

91 Kevin Morgan and Ellis Roberts, ‘The Democratic Deficit: a Guide to Quangoland’, Department of City and Regional Planning, University of Wales College of Cardiff, October 1993.

92 See ‘Cash cost of Language Act’, *Western Mail*, 10 February 1995.

93 See Jones, ‘From Referendum to Referendum’, pp. 105–6.

Wales was being denied a voice.⁹⁴

By the beginning of 1995, however, the Campaign had only 341 paid-up individual members and 72 local councils of different kinds. Some 130 members paid at least £5 per month by standing order to support the campaign, the backbone of its continued existence, but far greater resources were still needed. Membership was especially weak in Gwent and the south Wales valleys, and strongest in Dyfed. By this time some 50,000 people had signed the national petition. It was agreed that Judge Dewi Watkin Powell (who had a long and distinguished track record of involvement in devolutionary initiatives ever since the 1950s), together with the assistance of a small group of lawyers, should draft a Welsh home rule bill.⁹⁵ In February 1995, campaign supporters participated in a constitutional conference entitled 'Hands Across the Borders' held at Biggar, Lanarkshire, and addressed by Ron Davies MP, Paul Flynn MP, and Mari James, the co-ordinator of the Parliament for Wales Campaign. John Osmond then chaired a follow-up roundtable discussion.

By this time, the volume *A Parliament for Wales* had gone out of print and a re-print was arranged with Gwasg Gomer. Plans were also being formulated to publish the *Welsh Democracy Review*, a thirty-two-page, glossy A4 publication containing brief articles of about 1000 words each on various aspects of the campaign, to retail at £2 a copy. Contributors were to include several Welsh politicians sympathetic to the cause.⁹⁶ On St Davids Day 1995, the *Western Mail* published the results of a Beaufort Research Poll which revealed that 47 per cent of those questioned now favoured an elected assembly of some kind for Wales, while 24 per cent were opposed. Interestingly, the proportion of 'don't knows' was much higher among women (36 per cent) than among men (21 per cent).⁹⁷ There were still further grounds for optimism when the Labour Party leader Tony Blair announced that an incoming Labour government would introduce legislation for a Welsh assembly within the first year of assuming office. The campaign considered it essential that any such assembly would enjoy primary legislation powers, would be able to exercise certain tax-varying powers, and would be elected by a system of proportional representation.⁹⁸

In September 1995, the Liberal Democrats at their annual conference condemned the failure of the Labour Party to adopt proportional representation for the proposed Welsh Assembly and passed an emergency motion calling for a Welsh constitutional convention to be set up to negotiate a fair voting system. But the Labour Party remained committed to the traditional first-past-the-post system which would mean that the assembly was likely to have a near automatic in-built Labour majority. Peter Black, chairman of the Welsh Liberal Democrats,

94 Ron Davies, *Devolution: a Process, not an Event*, The Gregynog Papers, no. 2 (Cardiff: Institute of Welsh Affairs, 1999).

95 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/5, Campaign Council meeting minutes, Bangor, 21 January 1995. The committee's membership included Winston Roddick QC, Mervyn Phillips (the former Chief Executive of the Clwyd County Council), Ioan Bowen Rees, Paul Flynn MP, and John Osmond.

96 *Ibid.*, Campaign Council meeting minutes, 6 May 1995.

97 *Western Mail*, 1 March 1995.

98 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/5, AGM minutes, Aberystwyth, 24 June 1995.

told conference delegates, ‘Labour now is like a Stalinist party writ large. They are conservative with a small “c”. They are autocratic, anti-democratic and illiberal.’⁹⁹

Many fervent devolutionists still had severe doubts about the wisdom of convening a pre-legislative referendum. At the beginning of 1996, John Osmond wrote, ‘Amongst devolution supporters here of all colours my impression is one of overwhelming hostility to a referendum [...] and within the Labour Party for the additional reason of not wanting to revive the splits and divisions they experienced in 1979. As I said, opponents are likely to rally around a referendum. The referendum debate here is seen as entirely their territory.’¹⁰⁰ Osmond’s new book, *Welsh Europeans*, was launched at Cardiff during the same month at a packed meeting when historian Peter Stead chaired a lively debate between Lord (Dafydd) Elis-Thomas, Rhodri Morgan, Alex Carlile, and Andrew Taylor, the Conservative candidate in the forthcoming South Wales Euro constituency.

Morgan angered some within the WLP by advocating the use of PR in assembly elections, a line already taken by Ron Davies the previous summer. ‘Once the Assembly is established it must reflect the diversity and plurality of Welsh social, political and cultural life. By doing that we will have greater status for the Assembly as a national institution.’¹⁰¹ Indeed, discussion of the electoral system in the proposed assembly was now emerging as the dominant issue. The campaign’s national council in February called for the Single Transferable Vote system of PR to be deployed – for twenty double Westminster-sized constituencies, each to elect five assembly members and thus producing a chamber of 100 representatives. This policy was to be incorporated in the draft bill for a Parliament for Wales being produced on behalf of the campaign by the designated working party chaired by Judge Dewi Watkin Powell.¹⁰² These issues were causing a gaping rift within the WLP where there was deep-rooted dissension on which system would potentially benefit Labour the most in assembly elections.

At the end of April 1996, following years of dedicated service, John Osmond stood down as chair of the campaign following his recent appointment as the first Director of the Institute of Welsh Affairs. Mari James acted as a stop-gap chair for two months before the unopposed election of Phil Richards as the new chair. The following month, the WLP published a new policy document, *Preparing for a New Wales: A Report on the Structure and Workings of a Welsh Assembly*. PWC organizers welcomed its contents as ‘much more upbeat and positive than the rather apologetic and uncompromising document produced last year’, in so far as it endorsed some decision-making within the assembly.

But there was still disappointment at the party’s intransigence in relation to PR and tax-varying powers: ‘There was still room for improvement before legislation is introduced, so the debate goes on.’¹⁰³ The campaign condemned Labour’s plans

99 *Western Mail*, 20 September 1995.

100 NLW, John Osmond Papers, file 7, fax from John Osmond to Gerry Haltham, 31 January 1996 (copy).

101 *Red Kite* no. 38 (June 1995).

102 NLW, Robin Reeves Papers, file W/8, *Parliament for Wales Campaign Bulletin*, March 1996.

103 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/6, *Parliament for Wales Campaign Bulletin*, June 1996.

to hold a pre-legislative referendum which it dubbed ‘an undemocratic device. [...] However [it was] agreed [that it] should put out a press statement welcoming the principle of a referendum provided people were given the opportunity for a parliament with the power and resources to carry out its decisions.’¹⁰⁴ There was a powerful campaign presence at the August 1996 National Eisteddfod at Llandeilo when a total of £300 was collected towards campaign expenses and an additional 2,000 signatures were added to the national petition. It was unfortunate that a public meeting on the eisteddfod field addressed by Roger Roberts, Tom Ellis, and Gareth Hughes of Welsh Labour Action attracted only a small audience because of poor advance publicity.¹⁰⁵

Then came the announcement, a surprise in some quarters, that the Labour Party did indeed intend to hold a pre-legislative referendum:

There is no disguising that this has come as a big shock to everyone involved with this issue, not least, it seems, Ron Davies himself. And it fundamentally alters the nature of the campaign which this organisation has been pursuing since [it] was launched – or more accurately, given the presence of a few battle-scarred veterans of the 1970s Welsh Assembly campaign like Barry Jones, its secretary at that time – I should say relaunched in 1987.

But stoicism and optimism still prevailed generally within the ranks of the campaigners:

It is very easy to be pessimistic, particularly those of us who were involved in the 1970s referendum campaign. And when you see the utterances of Llew Smith it is certainly true when they say history repeats itself first as tragedy and secondly as farce. But we shall be in a completely different position from 1979. Then we were asking the Welsh electorate to accept the proposals of a deeply divided Labour Government in its dying days after it had been mortally wounded by trade unions’ winter of discontent. Someone reminded me yesterday that for part of the campaigning there was a journalist strike which our own campaign insisted on respecting but our opponents did not. This time – assuming Labour wins – we shall be fighting during the honeymoon period of the first new government for eighteen years.¹⁰⁶

There was a very real danger at this point that campaign activists might well be ‘unlikely to campaign for an Assembly with the limited powers now proposed’. The very act of holding the referendum would bring about ‘a serious danger opinions

104 NLW, Robin Reeves Papers, file W/8, executive committee meeting minutes, 1 July 1996.

105 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/6, campaign organizer’s report, September 1996.

106 Ibid.

would be polarised and political differences exaggerated'.¹⁰⁷ There was indeed an element of profound pessimism in the campaign camp. At the end of the year came alarmist reports of 'a falling off of local groups and that there were areas of Wales where there were no active members'.¹⁰⁸ On 11 December 1996, Dr John Marek, the Labour MP for Wrexham, introduced in the House of Commons a Government of Wales Bill drawn up by the PWC legal committee chaired by Judge Dewi Watkin Powell. It embodied three key differences from the devolution proposals advanced by the Labour Party – the Senedd, comprising 100 members, would have primary law-making powers ('Senedd acts'), Senedd members would be elected by PR under the STV system, and the Senedd would after four years have the opportunity to acquire tax-varying powers with the ability to raise or lower taxes by up to 3 pence in the pound.¹⁰⁹ Although it was at once recognized that Marek's measure stood no chance of becoming law, it did win the support in the Commons of several prominent Welsh politicians including Paul Flynn and Ann Clwyd for Labour, Alex Carlile for the Liberal Democrats, and Dafydd Wigley and Ieuan Wyn Jones for Plaid Cymru.¹¹⁰

At the beginning of the new year – 1997 – it became widely known that the 'Yes for Wales' campaign was about to be launched. A story was run in *Wales on Sunday* which, claiming a journalistic scoop, eagerly reported, 'A "rainbow coalition" of Welsh devolution supporters ranging from bishops to sportsmen is expected to reveal itself within weeks.'¹¹¹ The actual launch by the Very Rt Rev. Alwyn Rice Jones, the Archbishop of Wales, following several meetings of the 'Yes for Wales' steering committee held largely in private, took place at Cardiff on 9 February 1997, headed by Kevin Morgan, Professor of European Regional Development at the University of Wales, Cardiff. The campaign was the recipient of a grant of £25,000 from the Joseph Rowntree Reform Society and took pains to emphasize that it was to be strongly non-party in essence.¹¹² At the end of the same month, Tony Blair told the annual conference of the Welsh Labour Party at Llandudno, 'I promise you we will legislate for a Welsh Assembly in the first year of a Labour Government. And I promise you in the referendum that precedes that legislation, I will be with you, here, in Wales campaigning for a yes vote. And let us have a united Party in Wales behind our campaign.'¹¹³

The relationship between 'Yes for Wales' and the PWC was, at best, fraught and ambiguous, although the former generally sought 'a cordial relationship' with

107 Ibid., file 7/2, Phil Richards to Ron Davies, 10 September 1996 (copy). Copy also available in NLW, Robin Reeves Papers, file W/8.

108 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/6, Council meeting minutes, December 1996. See also the details in Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 26.

109 *Western Mail*, 12 December 1996.

110 Ibid.

111 *Wales on Sunday*, 19 January 1997. See also Clive Betts's reports in the *Western Mail*, 25 January 1997 and subsequently.

112 *South Wales Echo*, 10 February 1997. This newspaper issue contains much helpful material on the launch of the 'Yes for Wales' campaign.

113 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 5/7b, speech by Tony Blair to the annual conference of the Welsh Labour Party in the North Wales Conference Centre, 28 February 1997.

the latter.¹¹⁴ But in a letter published in the national press on 22 February the press officer of the PWC reflected the defeatist mood of so many of her colleagues: ‘A defeat for the Welsh Assembly is likely because the Labour Party will be telling the Scottish electorate that an assembly is second-best.’¹¹⁵ Relationships plummeted. In March, the PWC resolved that it would not decide on whether to campaign for a ‘Yes’ vote or not until June, after the general election. Its activists doubted whether they could come out in support of a ‘Yes’ vote if Labour won the general election since they genuinely feared that the proposed assembly did not go far enough.

Following the landslide Labour victory in the general election of May 1997, the Queen’s Speech predictably embodied the new government’s devolution plans, and a pre-legislative referendum was to be held at the end of September. At the beginning of May, within days of the election, Leighton Andrews of the ‘Yes’ campaign had protested strongly against there being a choice of devolution options, such as would be offered to Scottish voters. Such a move, he insisted, would give the impression that the ‘Yes’ campaign was ‘split, unable to agree among themselves, hesitant and confused’.¹¹⁶ The PWC, fearing the worst in a referendum, disagreed virulently.¹¹⁷ Predictably, both the PWC and Plaid Cymru continued to press the case for a multi-choice ‘preferendum’, the former strongly assailing ‘Yes for Wales’ as having been ‘spawned by Labour’s campaign managers’. On behalf of the ‘Yes for Wales’ campaign, Kevin Morgan responded angrily, ‘They were pushing for the much more maximalist version of the Assembly, and frankly my only concern was to get the Assembly up and running.’¹¹⁸

The Referendum Bill was launched on 15 May, and the PWC was left with little alternative but to support it on the ‘half a loaf’ principle, its chairman Phil Richards asserting, ‘The Government’s proposals do not go as far as we would like. We would wish the proposed body to have tax-varying and law-making powers and an electoral system which would be truly proportional. But the Assembly can be viewed as the first step on the way to the sort of Parliament Wales needs. The *status quo* is anyway not an option and a “No” vote in the referendum would do immense damage to Wales.’¹¹⁹ There were sharp divisions of opinion about whether the vote could be won, and on all sides it was realized that an immense amount of spadework was required to bring about the necessary mobilization of forces, many ‘Yes’ activists feeling that ‘the Parliament for Wales Campaign was too narrowly focused to be able to collect the wide degree of support necessary’.¹²⁰

But Wales had indeed changed markedly since 1979 and many diehard anti-

114 Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 76.

115 *The Guardian*, 22 February 1997.

116 *Western Mail*, 5 May 1997.

117 See Robin Reeves, ‘History must not repeat itself’, *Western Mail*, 12 May 1997.

118 Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 86.

119 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 10/1, PWC Newsletter, summer 1997, ‘First step on way to Parliament’.

120 Andrews, *Wales Says Yes*, p. 16.

devolutionists of that year had now been well and truly converted to the cause.¹²¹ At the beginning of that fateful September in 1997, the PWC executive committee resolved, ‘If there was a No vote, it was agreed not to blame individuals, to defend Ron Davies, argue that the Assembly was an ill thought out compromise and analyse [the] Parliament for Wales stance on the relationship between the political parties. If there was a Yes vote it was agreed to quote Blair’s comment that it was perfectly logical for a Parliament/Assembly to have tax-varying powers and to argue strongly for a Parliament and [a] democratic voting system urging MPs to amend legislation.’¹²²

The PWC played an important role throughout the 1997 referendum campaign, internal differences were generally muted, and almost 250,000 leaflets were distributed throughout most of the principality. An extremely narrow ‘Yes’ vote was the outcome at the end of September, and PWC activists were anxious to participate in an investigative commission announced by Ron Davies in the wake of the outcome.¹²³ They claimed to have foreseen the narrowness of the poll: ‘It came as no surprise to the Campaign that the result was so close. People were asked to vote for the least popular change to the *status quo*. There is a lot of polling evidence to suggest that a stronger measure would have got greater support.’ It still believed that it remained possible for the new assembly to at least initiate legislation and strongly advocated the setting up of an ‘all-Wales Civic Forum’ to work alongside the new assembly.¹²⁴

In the autumn of 1997, the PWC announced that it was ‘shocked’ at the government’s decision to opt for ‘closed party lists’ for the regional members of the assembly in the proposed Additional Member System and in the forthcoming European elections.¹²⁵ As widely anticipated, the Welsh National Assembly Bill was published at the end of January 1998, its provisions giving rise to ‘bitter disappointment with key aspects’ among PWC activists. According to Phil Richards, the measure conspicuously ‘fell short of the campaign’s aim of a law-making parliament akin to Scotland’s, [but] the assembly still represented an historic democratic advance for Wales. However, unless the Bill was strengthened, the Government would be creating a weaker Assembly than promised in its White Paper and in the run-up to the referendum, bringing the democratic process into disrepute.’ Many other weaknesses were highlighted and decried.¹²⁶ The bill duly reached the statute book in July.

From this point on, once the National Assembly had come into existence, the

121 For an admirable analysis of this dramatic sea-change, see NLW, John Osmond Papers, file 9, ‘The Welsh Assembly 1979 and 1997’ (unpublished typescript). See also Osmond, *Welsh Politics in the New Millennium*, Institute of Welsh Affairs Discussion Paper no. 11 (Cardiff: IWA, 1999).

122 NLW, Robin Reeves Papers, file W/8, PWC executive committee meeting minutes, 8 September 1997, 2.0, ‘After the Referendum’.

123 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 1/7, Dr John Cox, secretary of the PWC, to Ron Davies, 23 September 1997 (copy).

124 *Ibid.*, file 10/2, *PWC Newsletter, Autumn 1997*.

125 *Ibid.*, file 9/3, PWC press release, [autumn 1997].

126 NLW, John Osmond Papers, file 9, PWC press release, 1 February 1998, ‘Welsh National Assembly Bill “disappointing”’.

PWC aspired to be ‘a constructive but critical friend’ of the new body.¹²⁷ From day one, campaign activists kept an eagle eye on developments in Cardiff Bay, seeking to pinpoint weaknesses and failings, particularly when compared with the role and functions of the Scottish Parliament at Edinburgh.¹²⁸ By the spring of 2000, the campaign had embraced modern technology by setting up its own website which gave publicity to its future goals in relation to the development of the National Assembly and underlined its weaknesses and omissions. The objective was to update its contents each week with regular reports from members of the Assembly.¹²⁹ Alan Jobbins took over as general secretary of the campaign during the year 2000.

Little activity took place within PWC circles during the Assembly’s first year in existence, but a two-day tour of Cardiff and the ‘Welsh heartlands’ by Tony Blair at the beginning of April 2000 re-focused attention on devolution as it became increasingly apparent that the implementation of legislation by the Assembly (on a scale unknown by the Welsh Office since 1964) would prove onerous and potentially troublesome.¹³⁰ Three AMs worked regularly in close association with the PWC, Christine Humphreys (Liberal Democrat), Dr John Marek (Labour), and Owen John Thomas (Plaid Cymru). An array of distinguished political speakers addressed PWC meetings and events in the new millennium, among them Nick Bourne, Alun Cairns AM, Cynog Dafis MP, Edwina Hart AM, Dr John Marek AM, Adam Price MP, Keith Raffan MSP, and Kirsty Williams AM. Those speakers who were not professional politicians included the Rev. Aled Edwards, Professor Dylan Jones Evans, Michael Jones, Tom Jones, Eira Davies, and Professor Keith Patchett.¹³¹

In August 2000, Judge Dewi Watkin Powell summarized the main difficulties:

The basic problems of the Assembly are two-fold: *Constitutionally*, its powers of government are restricted to administrative discretions contained in some 700 sections of something like 250 statutes: there is no overall administrative power covering the topics with which the subject committees deal. *Administratively*, it is served by a body of civil servants the vast majority of the more senior of whom look to their departmental counterparts in Whitehall as was the case when they served in the Welsh Office. It is small wonder that there appears to be little understanding among members of the Assembly (and still less in the public at large) as to the extent of the Assembly’s decision making powers.¹³²

127 The phrase is that used by Alan Jobbins in ‘Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1988-2011’, p. 2.

128 NLW, Jill Hutt Papers, file 16, PWC circular, June 1999; NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit (uncatalogued), PWC AGM minutes, Aberystwyth, 10 July 1999.

129 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, file 10/1, PWC Newsletter, Spring 2000, especially the section ‘Ron warns’.

130 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, memorandum ‘Developing the Functions of the Assembly’, April 2000.

131 Jobbins, ‘Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1988-2011’, p. 3.

132 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, memorandum by His Honour Judge Dewi Watkin Powell, 22 August 2000.

The following month, Robin Reeves wrote in an internal memorandum that the ‘workings of the Assembly’ hitherto had ‘fulfilled the campaign’s worst fears’. He underlined the ‘cruel exposition’ of the Assembly’s defects by ‘the political timidity of the members and civil servants serving the Assembly’ and ‘the abject failure of Whitehall and Westminster to enter into the spirit of new constitutional arrangements in ways which threaten to undermine the Assembly’s credibility in the eyes of the general public’. Reeves then proceeded to quote specific examples.¹³³ There was great disappointment within the PWC that the Labour Party manifesto for the 2001 general election did not include pledges to provide a law-making and tax-varying Welsh parliament. The PWC pressed for the concession that the Assembly should ‘acquire the same legislative and budgetary powers as those exercised by the Scottish Parliament’. In reply, the new First Minister of the Assembly, Rhodri Morgan, argued strongly that the appropriate time to review the operation of the Government of Wales Act 1998 was during 2003–2004 after the Assembly had completed its first full term of office. But a commission had already been set up to review the Assembly’s role and functions.¹³⁴

In February 2002, the PWC published an attractive little booklet entitled *Steps on the Road: Quotations on Devolution for Wales* launched at the National Assembly at a high-profile event addressed by Lord Hooson and Judge Watkin Powell. An exhibition on the theme ‘Devolution for Wales’ had also been prepared for the occasion. At around the same time it was agreed to establish the Robin Reeves Memorial Essay Prize in memory of one of the recently deceased campaign stalwarts and the former editor of the *New Welsh Review*. The competition was open to politics students aged between 16 and 18 and those aged over 18. The following August at the St Davids National Eisteddfod in 2002 the campaign launched its publication, *Making a Difference/Gwneud Gwahaniaeth*, of which 2,800 copies were distributed, and the first copy was presented to Rhodri Morgan in a short ceremony. It was an attempt to prove that within a relatively short time-scale the Assembly had already made a tangible difference. Successive issues of the *Welsh Democracy Review/Democratiaeth Cymru* continued to appear, as did regular newsletters and leaflets on campaign activities and aspirations.¹³⁵

2002 saw the setting up by the government of the long awaited Richard Commission on the Powers and Electoral Arrangements of the National Assembly, chaired by Lord Richard of Ammanford, to which the PWC submitted in oral and written form an integrated package of eleven proposals, the most significant of which were the old chestnuts of an increase in the number of AMs from 60 to 100, the granting of primary law-making powers to the Assembly, an urgent review of the operation of the unpopular Barnett Formula, and the grant of tax-varying powers. The Richard Commission, comprising ten individuals of greatly varying backgrounds, spent two years taking evidence in all parts of Wales and was

133 Ibid., memorandum by Robin Reeves to the PWC executive committee, 11 September 2000.

134 Ibid., David Morris, chair of PWC, to the chief executives of the political parties in Wales, 5 April 2001, and Rhodri Morgan to Morris, 16 May 2001. See also Morris’s letter published in the *Western Mail*, 5 April 2001.

135 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, submission from Alan Jobbins to the Richard Commission, 8 November 2002.

described as ‘the biggest listening exercise ever undertaken in Welsh politics’.¹³⁶ Its final published report ran to 308 pages and it also contained many thousands of pages of published written evidence to support the proposals. It came out in favour of the creation of a legislative assembly for Wales, with powers to pass primary legislation in specified areas; an increase in the number of AMs from 60 to 80, all of whom should be elected by the STV system; while tax-varying powers were considered ‘desirable but [...] not essential’. These and other changes, it was estimated, would cost an additional £10 million a year.¹³⁷

It was suggested by the commissioners, who seemed to see no real need for hasty changes, that these reforms should be implemented by the year 2011. In response, a PWC spokesman commented, ‘It was imperative that the recommendations were acted upon before the next general election. The choice was either to transfer Primary Law making powers to the Assembly or to transfer them to the next Government at Westminster. Important Law making powers over the School curriculum and the NHS should come under the Assembly as should devolution of the Police, and Railways.’¹³⁸ The Assembly government’s immediate reaction to the Richard Commission report was guarded, reflecting the wide divergence within the WLP on the future evolution of the National Assembly. Some Labour MPs representing Welsh divisions were suspicious of any real growth in the powers of the Assembly, fearing a concomitant reduction in their numbers at Westminster.¹³⁹

In the summer of 2004, there was talk of Dr Barry Morgan, the Archbishop of Wales, chairing a new movement to discuss further the proposals of the Richard Commission, and there were fears that its recommendations might well be ‘totally sidelined’.¹⁴⁰ In a public lecture at the Newport National Eisteddfod under the auspices of the PWC, Dafydd Wigley supported the proposal that the Assembly should have the power to vary primary legislation by order: ‘Such a step should not be seen as one which frustrates the implementation of the Richard Commission proposals for a full legislative assembly, or parliament, by 2011. Indeed it can be a vital step in making that possible – both politically and administratively.’ Indeed, Plaid Cymru generally was hugely supportive of the Richard Commission initiatives, a line of argument also endorsed by the PWC.¹⁴¹

In September 2004, when the Labour Party Wales convened a special conference to debate the way ahead for the Assembly, delegates were urged ‘to support the Home Rule ideas of Keir Hardie 100 years ago’.¹⁴² The PWC held a further day school in November, and the pressure increased on Rhodri Morgan to hold a further

136 Mike German, ‘A Key to Unlock the Future’, in John Osmond (ed.), *Welsh Politics Comes of Age: Responses to the Richard Commission* (Cardiff: IWA, 2005), p. 101.

137 See *ibid.*, pp. 12–13. See also the stimulating chapter ‘Towards 2007’ by John Osmond within the same volume.

138 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, press release, 31 March 2004.

139 See John Davies, *A History of Wales*, rev. edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 2007), p. 682.

140 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, letter from Dr Barry Morgan to Chris Hewitt, Association of Teachers and Lecturers, Cardiff, 18 June 2004; letter from Dr Russell Deacon published in the *Western Mail*, 14 July 2004.

141 *Ibid.*, press release, 1 August 2004; e-mail from Ieuan Wyn Jones to Alan Jobbins, 3 August 2004.

142 *Ibid.*, press releases, 10 September 2004.

referendum on law-making powers for the Assembly.¹⁴³ As another general election approached in 2005, it was anticipated that devolution would return to the centre of the political agenda. PWC activists were most anxious that the Assembly should not simply degenerate into the ‘Mid Glamorgan County Council on stilts’. But, strangely enough, during the general election campaign, devolution was all but ignored as attention focused mainly on the war with Iraq and the personal standing of the Prime Minister, Tony Blair.¹⁴⁴

In due course, the Government of Wales Act 2006 made provision for a further vote for increased legislature competencies and other constitutional changes. After this, the activities of the PWC began to wind down and the question of a commemorative plaque, possibly within the Pierhead Building, was under discussion. But some activists still wished to keep the campaign going to press on for the creation of a genuine Welsh parliament. There was talk again of setting up a civil forum to expedite matters, but the campaign suffered something of a blow with the resignation of Peter Hain as Secretary of State for Wales in February 2008.¹⁴⁵ As the All-Wales Convention, chaired by the prestigious figure of Sir Emyr Jones Parry, began its work ‘to review Wales’s constitutional arrangements and in particular to spearhead the campaign to increase the powers of the Assembly to a full legislative parliament similar to the Scottish Parliament’, attention focused on the transfer of functions and financial authority from Westminster to Cardiff Bay, a line of argument pressed by a new pressure group called Cymru Yfory or Tomorrow’s Wales which joined forces to some extent with the PWC.¹⁴⁶

On behalf of the PWC, Dr Russell Deacon and Dr John Cox presented evidence to the All-Wales Convention, while other members attended the public meetings of the Convention to place PWC views and ideas before members of the Convention and members of the general public.¹⁴⁷ The Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition government agreement of 2007 committed the Assembly government to work towards ‘a successful outcome of a referendum for law-making powers [...] as soon as practicable, or at least before the end of the Assembly term. But the referendum many people seem to think is guaranteed is not. Whether there is one will depend, it seems, on Emyr Jones Parry’s reading of the nation’s pulse.’¹⁴⁸ The PWC was gradually winding down: ‘The Campaign is still active although the work is perhaps less exciting than in the 90s and we are less visible than in the days of street campaigning.’ Yet, convinced that the provisions of the 2006 Act were fundamentally inadequate, it still wished to continue to function as ‘a critical yet constructive voice for further devolution’.¹⁴⁹

Its proposals to the Assembly focused mainly on aspects of funding, finance,

143 Greg Lewis, ‘Fresh push for Vote on Power’ (‘Exclusive’), *Wales on Sunday*, 21 November 2004.

144 Davies, *A History of Wales*, p. 683.

145 *Daily Post*, 25 January 2008.

146 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, Dr Barry Morgan, chairman of Cymru Yfory, to Alan Jobbins, 13 May 2008.

147 Jobbins, ‘Parliament for Wales Campaign, 1988–2011’, p. 4.

148 Patrick O’Brien in the *Cambrian News*, 29 May 2008.

149 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, General Secretary’s report for October–December 2008.

and taxation, and spirits rose in some quarters at the possibility of tax cuts in Wales. Real concern arose from the continued operation of the very unpopular Barnett formula, wholly outdated as it was by this time in the face of rapidly declining Welsh prosperity in most areas in a period of post-industrial recession. The relationship between the Assembly and the Westminster Treasury remained fundamental as the former was wholly financed by a block grant from the latter, while the Scottish Parliament had the power to vary income tax up or down by three pence in the pound (although it had not taken advantage of this).¹⁵⁰ At this time these issues were being examined by the Holtham Commission, led by Gerry Holtham and two other highly regarded financial experts.

The chairman of the PWC during its final period was George Crabb whose committed predecessors in the position were the late David Morris (formerly the MEP for Mid and West Wales), Ruth Parry, and Professor Russell Deacon. Alan Jobbins acted as an admirable general secretary, organizer, and publications officer for several years, executing each office with exemplary dedication and efficiency. The treasurer was Gareth Davies. Gareth Butler served with distinction as the campaign's long-term press correspondent. One of its former secretaries, Dr John Cox, the author of *Fair Votes for Wales*, remained a member of the PWC executive committee until the end of the campaign. All of these highly committed individuals made a very substantial contribution to the success of the campaign.

In the spring of 2009, the PWC joined forces with Sustainable Wales and the peace and justice network Cynefin y Werin under the banner of Llais Cymru (Welsh Voice) in making a lively submission to the All-Wales Convention which was preparing a rigorous report on the granting of enhanced powers to the Assembly, including the question of a further referendum on law-making powers. Not mincing its words in the least, the joint submission asserted that Welsh government remained the preserve of the 'usual suspects', Welsh political life having well nigh degenerated into an entertaining 'spectator sport'. It continued,

Frankly we are in dire need of fresh blood and modern ideas in politics, community work and local decision making. [...] The stage is set in Wales for an inclusive style of politics and there is evidence that citizens are willing and able to take on more decision-making responsibility. [...] Although the Assembly has clearly achieved some very important things for Wales, it has, however, failed to achieve an acceptable level of credibility in the eyes of a still substantial proportion of the population.¹⁵¹

At a major public speech in the Pabell y Cymdeithasau at the Bala National Eisteddfod in August 2009, former Plaid Cymru president Dafydd Wigley reminded

150 See the columns 'With luck we could end up with some tax cuts', and 'How a devolved Wales gets its money', *Western Mail*, 6 January 2009, and 'Galwad i dalu llai o drethi – er mwyn y Gymru wledig', *Y Cymro*, 9 Ionawr 2009.

151 *Western Mail*, 20 March 2009; NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, letter from Alan Jobbins to Sir Emyr Jones Parry, 18 August 2009, 'Evidence to the All-Wales Convention' (copy).

his audience that the Labour-Plaid Cymru coalition government of 2007 was founded on a promise that the two parties would work together towards holding a further referendum ‘at or before the end of the Assembly term’ in 2011. He insisted that there was now ‘no earthly reason’ why the vote could not indeed take place as was hoped.¹⁵² The PWC campaign pressed for the setting up of a Fair Funding Commission charged with devising a replacement for the Barnett Formula ‘based on a test for fairness and accountability’.¹⁵³ Before the end of the year, the WLP had generally endorsed the provisions of the Government of Wales Act 2006, namely ‘the incremental devolution of powers to the Assembly whilst at the same time placing on the statute book full law-making powers for the Assembly if and when the people of Wales decide that is what they want’.¹⁵⁴

In November 2010, the PWC agreed to donate a total of £3,000 to the ‘Say Yes for Wales’ campaign, retaining some resources for closing down expenses and other costs. It was agreed that the movement should ‘publicly end’ on 4 March 2011. PWC activists worked hard during the 2011 referendum campaign in an attempt to prove that a substantial ‘Yes’ vote would reflect the ‘settled will’ of the Welsh people.¹⁵⁵ As late as February 2013 it made a substantial submission, coordinated by Gareth Butler, to the Silk Commission on ‘The Basic Principles of a Devolution Settlement and the Rights of the Welsh’.¹⁵⁶ Thereafter the organization was brought to an end, its supporters justifiably experiencing some sense of pride and elation in its very real achievements over 26 years.

152 *Western Mail*, 3 August 2009; *Daily Post*, 4 August 2009; *Y Cymro*, 12 Awst 2009.

153 *Western Mail*, 11 August 2009, letter from Alan Jobbins entitled ‘Raising taxes’.

154 NLW, Parliament for Wales Campaign Records, 2013 deposit, Peter Hain to Alan Jobbins, 9 November 2009.

155 *Ibid.*, circular e-mail from Alan Jobbins, 24 November 2010; e-mail from Russell Deacon to Alan Jobbins, 11 January 2011.

156 See <<http://commissionondevolutioninwales.independent.gov.uk/files/2013/03/Parliament-for-Wales-Campaign.pdf>> (accessed 18 July 2014).